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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Donald Houser appeals challenging the amount of restitution ordered by the 
district court. He contends that the district court improperly awarded restitution to his 
brother, Douglas "Doogie" Houser, for time he took off work unrelated to any of the 
proceedings in this case. The State responds that the district court could rightfully 
award restitution because Doogie spent time at the hearings, not just those hearings at 
which Doogie testified. Even accepting that assertion as true, it is still improper for the 
district court to award restitution for the time Doogie took off of work but was not 
attending a hearing in this case. Additionally, the State asserts that the district court did 
not award credit for the time taken on August 22, 2011, just as it did not award credit for 
August 24 and 25, 2011. That is factually inaccurate, as the district court did award the 
time for August 22, 2011. Since Doogie was requesting that award because he was 
emotionally shaken, that award was not authorized by the statute. Therefore, this Court 
should vacate the improper restitution awards, or, alternatively, remand this case for a 
new restitution hearing 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Hauser's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court exceeded its statutory authority when it ordered Mr. Houser to 
pay restitution for losses which were not the result of his criminal conduct, and for 
losses which were claimed for emotional distress. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Exceeded Its Statutory Authority When It Ordered Mr. Houser To Pay 
Restitution For Losses Which Were Not The Result Of His Criminal Conduct, And For 
Losses Which Were Claimed For Emotional Distress 
A Introduction 
This Court should vacate the restitution award in this case because it exceeded 
the district court's statutory authority to award. The restitution statute is intentionally 
narrow in scope, allowing recovery for only those damages caused by the defendant's 
culpable actions and not every out of pocket expense the victim could potentially claim. 
In this case, the district court awarded restitution for entire days that Doogie Houser 
took off work so that he could attend court proceedings that lasted minutes. Those lost 
wages, apart from the time Doogie was in court, were not caused by Mr. Heuser's 
culpable actions, and as such, not properly awarded under the restitution statute. As 
such, those awards should be vacated. Nevertheless, the State contends that these 
awards should be affirmed. In addition, the district court awarded restitution for the time 
Doogie took off work on August 22, 2011, which Doogie claimed he took off for 
emotional reasons. The State erroneously believes there was no award for that date. 
Since such an award is not authorized under the statute, it should be vacated as well. 
8. There Is No Statutory Authority For The Damages Not Caused By Mr. Heuser's 
Criminal Conduct, Notably, The Wages Lost Because Of Doogie's Optional 
Choice To Attend Hearings Rather Than Go To Work 
Idaho's restitution statute only allows for recovery of those necessary expenses 
the victim endures to address the defendant's culpable conduct. State v. Parker, 143 
Idaho 165, 168 (Ct. App. 2006). Such expenses may include those where the victim 
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took time to be in court or otherwise address the effects of the culpable actions. See, 
e.g., State v. Russell, 126 Idaho 38, 39 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding the time spent in court 
by a victim "who has been called to testify about the losses caused to him through 
criminal conduct of defendant" was recoverable as restitution); State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 
873, 880-81 (Ct. App. 2004), abrogated on other grounds (affirming the magistrate's 
award of restitution for "earnings lost by [the minor victim's] parents for time they were 
off work to attend court proceedings or other matters related to Doe's case") (emphasis 
added); State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 379 (Ct. App. 2004) (allowing restitution for the 
time employees of the victim business "spent away from their normal duties in order to 
determine the extent of Olpin's theft. . .. The victim's expenses in sending its vice 
president to the restitution hearing are much [the same]") (emphasis added). Even 
though such losses may be claimed as restitution, "[i]t does not follow, however, that 
restitution may be ordered ... for any out-of-pocket expense that the victim would not 
have incurred but for the defendant's crime." Parker, 143 Idaho at 168. (emphasis in 
original). The difference between Doogie's claims and those in Russell, Doe, and Olpin, 
is that there is no evidence that Doogie was doing anything related to Mr. Heuser's case 
after the hearings. (See generally R., Tr.) The State bears the burden to make a prima 
facie showing of loss. State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 114 (Ct. App. 2008). As there is 
no evidence in this regard, the State has failed to meet that burden, and therefore, the 
restitution award for the whole day on each of those occasions is inappropriate under 
the statute. 
Nevertheless, the State claims that, even though Doogie was not subpoenaed to 
testify, nor did he give testimony at any of those hearings, the award of a full day's 
4 
wages is still appropriate under the restitution statute. (See Resp. Br., pp.3-6.) Even if 
the State's premise - that Doogie should get restitution for the time he was in court but 
not testifying (see Resp. Br., p.5) - is accepted as true, its conclusion that he should get 
a full day's wage is still wrong. 1 To properly be awarded as restitution, the time off must 
still be used to address the defendant's culpable actions. See, e.g., Russell, 126 Idaho 
at 39; Doe, 140 Idaho at 880-81; Olpin, 140 Idaho at 379. While Doogie did testify that 
he was in court on most of the days in question,2 the record is clear that those hearings 
did not last all day. The hearing on August 31, 2011, only took thirteen minutes. 
(R., p.21.) Doogie admitted he only spent an hour in the courtroom on that date. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.177, L.24 - p.178, L.2.) The hearing on August 23, 2011, lasted seven 
minutes. (R., p.16.) The hearing on September 6, 2011, took only ten minutes. 
(R., pp.25-26.) By his own admission, Doogie only spent thirty minutes in the courtroom 
on that date. (Tr., Vol.1, p.178, Ls.7-14.) The hearing on September 12, 2011, lasted a 
total of seventeen minutes. (R., p.31.) The hearing on December 12, 2011, only took 
six minutes. (R., p.43.) And the hearing on January 23, 2012, took only eight minutes. 
(R., p.48.) Yet, even though the hearings took fifty-six minutes, Doogie received 
1 There is no evidence, as discussed in detail in the Appellant's Brief, that Doogie 
testified at any of the hearings in question. (See App. Br., pp.10-12.) As such, his 
attendance was optional and he chose to leave work to attend those hearings; while he 
may have a right to attend those hearings, he did not have to do so. The restitution 
statute does not provide for recovery for losses caused by the optional exercise of a 
right. See l.C. § 19-5304; Parker, 143 Idaho at 167-68; State v. Waidelich, 140 Idaho 
622, 624 (Ct. App. 2004); Card, 146 Idaho at 114-17. 
2 He could not remember being in court on November 14, 2011, nor could he refute the 
assertion by defense counsel that he was not. (Tr., Vol.1, p.178, L.16 - p.179, L.4.) 
Since the State bears the burden to make a prima facie showing of loss, see Card, 146 
Idaho at 114, it has failed to meet its burden in regard to November 14, 2011, and that 
award should be vacated. 
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restitution for sixty-four hours of work. (Augmentation - State's Exhibit 1; Tr., Vol.1, 
p.188, Ls.1-3.) That is improper under the statute, and therefore, those awards should 
be vacated. 
Even assuming that Doogie was there for more than just the hearing time itself, 
as the district court indicated he might have been (see Tr., p.188, Ls.3-5), his own 
admissions reveal that he was not spending the whole day waiting for a hearing to 
begin, but was rather spending an hour at most at the courthouse on these dates. (See, 
e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.177, L.24 - p.178, L.2; Tr., Vol.1, p.178, Ls.7-14.) There is no 
evidence that Doogie spent the remainder of his day doing anything related to 
Mr. Heuser's culpable conduct. (See genera!Jy R., Trs.) As such, the State failed to 
make its prima facie showing of loss and those awards are improper under the 
restitution statute. Card, 146 Idaho at 114; Parker, 143 Idaho at 168. Therefore, those 
awards, not authorized by the statute, should be vacated. 
C. There Is No Statutory Authority For The Damages For Emotional Distress 
Awards for less tangible damages, such as emotional distress damages, are 
expressly excluded by the restitution statute. State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 889 
(2013). Nevertheless, Doogie requested restitution for the time he took off work on 
August 22, 2011, specifically, "Time Taken For Being Emotionally Shaken." 
(Augmentation - State's Exhibit 1.) The district court decided: "First item is August 
22nd. [Doogie] testified that the reason he didn't go into work that day was because 
the defendant had not been taken into custody. I find that reasonable given the 
circumstances of this case, so I will allow that 10 hours." (Tr., Vol.1, p.187, Ls.6-10 
(emphasis added).) The State appears to have misinterpreted that statement, since it 
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asserted "restitution was not ordered for those days," referring to August 22, 24, and 25, 
2011. (Resp. Br., p.7.) The district court properly disallowed restitution for August 24 
and 25, 2011, because they were claiming emotional damages. (Tr., Vol.1, p.187, 
Ls.17-22.) As such, all Mr. Houser challenged in this regard was the restitution for 
August 22, 2011, awarded because Doogie was "Emotionally Shaken." (See App. Br., 
p.15.) Such awards are expressly excluded under the statute, and so, should be 
vacated as well. Straub, 153 Idaho at 889. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Houser respectfully requests this Court vacate the restitution order in his 
case. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a 
new restitution hearing. 
DATED this 4th day of June, 2013. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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